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ABSTRACT: Argumentations are at the heart of the deductive and the hypothetico-
deductive methods, which are involved in attempts to reduce currently open problems to
problems already solved. These two methods span the entire spectrum of problem-oriented
reasoning from the simplest and most practical to the most complex and most theoretical,
thereby uniting all objective thought whether ancient or contemporary, whether humanistic
or scientific, whether normative or descriptive, whether concrete or abstract. Analysis,
synthesis, evaluation, and function of argumentations are described. Perennial philosophic
problems, both epistemic and ontic, related to argumentations are put in perspective. So
much of what has been regarded as logic is seen to be involved in the study of argumenta-
tions that logic may be usefully defined as the systematic study of argumentations, which is
virtually identical to the quest of objective understanding of objectivity.
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Argumentation is one of the activities characteristic of rational life, in the
humblest and in the most exalted senses of 'rational'. The use of reason is
inseparable from argumentation. Argumentations are often involved in
assenting, in dissenting and in doubting. Whether we are making up our
minds or changing our minds, argumentation is often present. Argumenta-
tion is so constantly our companion that conscious effort is required even
to notice it - unless there is a dysfunction. And once we have noticed it
we learn to describe it and to analyse it only with great difficulty.
Some propositions are known to be true and some are known to be
false. But the propositions that are important to us often include hypoth-
eses, propositions which are neither known to be true nor known to be
false. Many hypotheses have gained international attention: The Goldbach
Hypothesis, The Continuum Hypothesis, The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis,
and so on. But many hypotheses concern mundane matters of limited
interest. Every hypothesis is either actually true or actually false. But no
hypothesis is either known to be true or known to be false - by the
person for whom it is a hypothesis. Some propositions are hypotheses for
some persons but not for others. For some persons the proposition that
every true proposition can be known to be true is a hypothesis. For some
persons this proposition had been a hypothesis but now has been settled.
Some persons who now believe that they have settled the hypothesis will
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later realize that they had not settled it at all. Some propositions thought
to be known to be true are not really known to be true. In fact, some of
them are false. Some propositions thought to be known to be false are not
really known to be false. In fact, some of them are true.
Hypotheses excite our interest and curiosity. We understand the hypoth-
esis. We know that it is either true or false but we do not know which.
How will it turn out? How can we settle the matter? Can we settle it on
the basis of what we already know or do we need new information?
1. Settling Hypotheses by Argumentations. Argumentation is involved in
settling hypotheses on the basis of what we already know. Every argumen-
tation that deduces the hypothesis from premises already known to be true
proves the hypothesis to be true. This, of course, is the deductive method
of settling a hypothesis. Every argumentation that deduces a proposition
known to be false from the hypothesis alone or from the hypothesis
augmented by premises known to be true proves the hypothesis to be
false. This, of course, is the hypothetico-deductive method of settling a
hypothesis. Using the deductive method the hypothesis is proved to be
true. Using the hypothetico-deductive method the hypothesis is proved to
be false. But not every attempt to use one of these methods is successful.
The methods themselves are reliable, but in certain situations neither can
be applied and sometimes apparent applications are not successful because
of mistakes made by the person attempting the application. It is important
to distinguish the methods themselves from attempts to apply them.
The names Aristotle, Euclid, Archimedes, Newton, Hilbert and Tarski
often come to mind in connection with the deductive method. The names
Socrates, Galileo, Saccheri, Duhem and Popper often come to mind in
connection with the hypothetico-deductive method. But the prestige that
these two methods enjoy should not blind us to the fact that they were in
use long before the Golden Age of Greek Learning and that they are in
constant use today by people all over the world - many of whom have
never heard of them.
The deductive method is reliable because every hypothesis deduced
from propositions known to be true is itself true. Ideally speaking, every
hypothesis known to be deduced from premises known to be true is itself
known to be true. The hypothetico-deductive method is reliable because
every hypothesis from which a false proposition has been deduced is itself
false. Ideally speaking, a hypothesis is known to be false once a proposi-
tion known to be false has been deduced from it alone or from it taken
together with propositions already known to be true. People have relied
on these methods long before they were able to explain or, even to ask,
why the methods are reliable.
In the ideal case, application of the deductive method begins after three
things are available: the hypothesis itself, a set of premises known to be
true and a conjecture that the hypothesis is true. The problem is to find a
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chain of reasoning that deduces the hypothesis from the premises. This
problem is, of course, not always solvable. In the ideal case, application of
the hypothetico-deductive method begins after four things are available:
the hypothesis itself, a set of premises known to be true, a proposition
known to be false, and a conjecture that the hypothesis is false. The
problem is to find a chain of reasoning that deduces the proposition
known to be false from the hypothesis augmented by the other premises.
This problem, of course, is not always solvable.
In successful applications of the deductive method, the chain of reason-
ing is often the largest part of the argumentation; the chain of reasoning is
often reported in a discourse-text several times as long as the text that
expresses the premises and the hypothesis. Likewise, mutatis mutandis, in
successful applications of the hypothetico-deductive method.
In a sense before we resort to these methods we have tacitly raised a
question: is the problem of determining the truth-value of the hypothesis
reducible to similar problems which have already been solved? Argumen-
tation is involved in reducing new problems to old ones that have been
solved. Argumentation connects present challenges with past successes.
The deductive and hypothetico-deductive methods make it possible to
reduce a new problem of a non-logical character to a new problem of a
logical character, viz. the problem of whether a certain kind of argumenta-
tion exists.
In practice application of either method often starts with the hypothesis
alone. Then a conjecture is made. The conjecture that the hypothesis is
true leads to a search for a set of propositions known to be true and
sufficient to imply the hypothesis itself. This search typically uncovers
various sets of propositions. In each case we need to check whether the
propositions are known to be true and whether they can be used as a
premise-set from which the original hypothesis can be deduced. Thus we
are led in typical cases to further hypotheses and to further applications of
the deductive method - and in some cases to applications of other
methods. Not every problem that we encounter is reducible to problems
that we have already solved.
It happens sometimes that we find a proposition that implies the
hypothesis and we actually construct a chain of reasoning establishing this
implication only to discover that this implying proposition can not be used
because it is not known to be true. In some cases we realize that the
proposition implying the hypothesis is actually known to be false. Finding
a proposition which is false and which implies the hypothesis does not by
itself show that the conjecture of truth was wrong. Thinking otherwise is
the fallacy of falsified implicants. Every true proposition is implied by
infinitely many false propositions. Thus the network of implications
terminating with a given hypothesis which happens to be true can be
expected to involve many blind alleys.
In practice, the conjecture that the hypothesis is false, which involves
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us in the hypothetico-deductive method, leads us to a search for con-
sequences of the hypothesis rather than implicants of it. The search
continues for consequences of consequences, and so on, until we find a
consequence known to be false. Finding a consequence that turns out to
be known to be true does not by itself show that the hypothesis is true, i.e.
that the conjecture of falsehood is wrong. Thinking otherwise is the fallacy
of verified consequences. Every false proposition implies infinitely many
true propositions. Thus the network of implications originating with a
given hypothesis which happens to be false can be expected to involve
many blind alleys.
Now, as the search for consequences of consequences of the hypothesis
progresses we attempt to augment the chain (or chains) of reasoning with
additional premises known to be true. This involves further hypotheses,
further conjectures and further applications of the two methods and
perhaps applications of other methods as well.
Thus an attempted application of either of these methods tends to
generate an array of new hypotheses, new conjectures, new argumenta-
tions, increased awareness of the scope and limits of present knowledge,
and increased awareness of the interrelatedness among propositions -
whether known to be true, known to be false, or not known either way.
The result of a successful application of either method is an argumentation
that settles a hypothesis; in one case a proof that the hypothesis is true, i.e.
a proof of the hypothesis; in the other case a proof that the hypothesis is
false, i.e. a disproof of the hypothesis. Such results are clearly within the
realm of justification, apodictics, as opposed to the realm of discovery,
heuristics. Neither the deductive method nor the hypothetico-deductive
method is a method for discovering hypotheses in the first place. Neither
method is a method for discovering chains of reasoning. There are various
heuristics for discovering hypotheses - perhaps the most familiar is the
method of analogy. There are various heuristics for discovering chains of
reasoning. Perhaps the most familiar is the so-called method of analysis
which involves imagining that the desired chain of reasoning has already
been constructed.
It is clear that being true is one thing and being known to be true is
another. Likewise, mutatis mutandis for being false and being known to be
false. Truth and falsehood is a matter of ontics. Knowledge of truth and
falsehood is a matter of epistemics. Proof is one criterion of truth and
disproof is one criterion of falsehood. Argumentations are therefore at the
heart of at least some of the criteria of truth and falsehood. It is also clear
that direct experience of the subject-matter is involved in other criteria of
truth and falsehood, and indeed that proof and disproof presuppose such
other criteria. Nevertheless, the search for an argumentation that settles a
hypothesis is an attempt to apply criteria of truth and falsehood.
Sometimes the search for an argumentation that settles a hypothesis can
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lead to a surprising and disconcerting result. For example, sometimes we
can think that we have deduced a conclusion thought to be false from a
hypothesis augmented by premises thought to be true and then discover
that the hypothesis itself played no role in the reasoning. This means that
we have arrived at an argumentation that seems to deduce a conclusion
thought to be false from premises thought to be true.
An argumentation that seems to deduce a conclusion thought to be
false from premises thought to be true is called a paradox. The phrases
'seems to deduce', 'thought to be false' and 'thought to be true' make tacit
elliptical reference to a participant. One and the same argumentation that
is a paradox for one participant may seem to another participant to be a
proof that its conclusion is true and it may seem to another participant to
be a proof that a certain one of its premises is false and to yet another
participant it may seem to involve fallacious reasoning. Perhaps the most
important point here is that an argumentation that actually is a paradox
for a given participant at a given time can fail to be a paradox for the same
participant at a later time. It goes without saying that the converse is also
true, viz. that an argumentation that is not a paradox for a given partici-
pant at one time may become a paradox for the same participant at a later
time.
The process of converting a paradox into a non-paradox is called
solving the paradox or resolving the paradox. People feel uncomfortable
when they have a paradox. The reason for this is not hard to find: no false
proposition is deducible from true propositions. In a paradox at least one
of three unhappy situations occurs: either the conclusion which was
thought to be false is really true, or one of the premises thought to be true
is really false, or the chain of reasoning that was thought to deduce the
conclusion from the premises does not really do so.
Discovery of a paradox virtually forces critical examination of beliefs
and of reasoning. After the initial shock there is a period, sometimes brief
and sometimes not so brief, wherein at least four propositions which had
been beliefs get demoted to mere hypotheses: the proposition that the
conclusion is false, the proposition that the premises are all true, the
proposition that the chain of reasoning deduces the conclusion from the
premises and the proposition that the conclusion is actually implied by the
premises. The last two hypotheses raise two issues that concern us below.
One: by what criteria do we determine a chain of reasoning to be cogent
or fallacious? Two: by what criteria do we determine that a conclusion
does or does not follow from given premises?
It is clear from what has been said that some argumentations are
settling and that some are unsettling. Some are used to expand the scope
of what we think we know. Some are used to reveal that we do not really
know all that we think that we know. Some lead us to assent. Some lead us
to dissent. Some lead us to doubt.
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2. Proofs: Argumentations Productive of Knowledge. Every proof is an
argumentation that proves its conclusion to be true. Every proposition
proved to be true is known to be true by those persons who have proved
it to be true. Every proposition known to be true is really true. There is no
such thing as "a proof having a false conclusion" or "a proof whose
conclusion is not known to be true". Just as "known to be true" makes
tacit reference to a knower, "proof" and "proved to be true" make tacit
reference to a participant or to a community of participants.
One well-known proof of the irrationality of the square-root of two
uses as a premise the proposition that every number whose square is even
is itself even, which of course is easy to prove. But no argumentation that
uses this proposition as a premise is a proof to a person who does not
know this proposition to be true. To such a person, such argumentations
beg the question, they use an unwarranted premise.
Every premise of a proof is known to be true by those persons for
whom that proof is conclusive. Every argumentation having a premise not
known to be true by a given person begs the question to that person. The
fallacy of begging the question, also called unwarranted premise, is using in
an intended proof a premise not known to be true by the intended
audience. Since no false proposition is known to be true, every argumenta-
tion having a false premise begs the question. Although every false
proposition implies infinitely many true propositions, no false proposition
"proves" even one true proposition. More precisely, no false proposition is
a premise of a proof.
The terms 'proof', 'proved to be true' and even 'question-begging' make
tacit reference not only to a particular audience but also to a particular
time. An argumentation that begs the question for a given person at a
given time may well be a proof for that person at a later time if that
person gained new knowledge in the meantime. In fact, as we have already
seen, one heuristic for applying the deductive method involves construc-
tion of one question-begging argumentation after another all fanning out
from the original hypothesis until all of the ultimate premises are known to
be true. When this happens the formerly question-begging argumentations
become proofs.
Aristotle and others including Pascal and Frege seem to think that
every premise of a genuine proof is either a "first principle" or else is a
conclusion in an array of proofs whose ultimate premises are "first
principles". A "first principle" is a proposition which is verifiable without
proof by every knower. In fact, Aristotle, Pascal and Frege seem to think
that it is always possible to begin with a given proposition known to be
true and to work backward to find the "first principles" which form "the"
ultimate premises for the given proposition. The hypothesis that such "first
principles" exist has not been disproved but evidence in favor of it seems
flimsy. The fact that demonstrative or apodictic knowledge presupposes
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prior knowledge is clear enough, but the idea that the ultimately pre-
supposed prior knowledge is universally verifiable seems implausible.
Likewise, it seems implausible to think that some verifiable propositions
can not be deduced from any other verifiable propositions. The issue of
the nature of the prior knowledge is not important in this essay. What is
important, however, is that in order for an argumentation to be a proof to
a given audience it is not necessary for its premises to be known to be true
by persons not in the given audience. For example, it is common for one
person to present to others an argumentation that is a proof for the
presenter but which begs questions for the others.
Russell, Tarski, Popper and others seem to think that responsible and
well-grounded belief is obtainable by humans but that knowledge in the
strict sense is beyond our capacity. If no proposition is known to be true,
then every argumentation begs the question to everyone and there is no
such thing as a proof. Those who believe that knowledge is impossible
describe an analogue of the deductive method as a means of increasing
responsible certainty rather than as a means of gaining knowledge. It is
true that we can and do increase our degree of confidence in a given
proposition by deducing it from propositions that we are more confident
of. This may be called the probabilistic deductive method. This method is
rather more complicated than the deductive method and discussion of it is
beyond the scope of this essay.
The hypothesis that there is no knowledge in the strict sense can not be
proved and the evidence in favor of it seems flimsy. If it is true, then
knowledge is an ideal to which we strive but which we never attain. If there
is no knowledge, then proof is also an ideal to which we strive but which we
never attain. The present essay assumes the working hypothesis that knowl-
edge in the strict sense is difficult to obtain but is nevertheless abundant.
However, not every proposition thought to be known to be true is really
known to be true. There are ample grounds for caution in these matters.
This essay steers a middle course between two extreme views. On
the one hand, it avoids foundationalism, the view attributed above to
Aristotle, Pascal and Frege which presupposes universally knowable "first
principles" as the ultimate premises for all propositions proved to be true.
On the other hand, it avoids probabilism, the view attributed above to
Russell, Tarski and Popper which presupposes the impossibility of knowl-
edge. In practice this essay does not conflict with much of what has been
written by foundationalists or probabilists. The foundationalists rarely
exhibit their "first principles" and they never prove that their alleged "first
principles" are really "ultimate" or really universally knowable. The
probabilists often treat responsible and well-grounded belief as if it were
knowledge.
Not every argumentation whose premises are all known to be true is a
proof. Every such argumentation that is not a proof involves a fallacious
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chain of reasoning, a chain of reasoning which does not deduce the
conclusion of the argumentation from its premises. In some cases, the
chain of reasoning is fallacious per se, for example, by virtue of logical
errors. The literature of mathematics contains many instances of argu-
mentations whose chains of reasoning are fallacious in themselves but
which were later corrected. In these cases, the premises were known to be
true and the conclusion was actually deducible from the premise-set but
the chain of reasoning was inadequate. In some cases, the chain of
reasoning is fallacious in context (sc. of the argumentation at issue), for
example by virtue of using premises not among the premises of the
argumentation or by virtue of reaching a conclusion other than the con-
clusion of the argumentation.
An argumentation is said to involve the fallacy of premise-smuggling
(also called hidden premise and suppressed premise) if its chain of reason-
ing uses as premises propositions not among the premises of the argumen-
tation. As the result of work by many thinkers, including Archimedes,
Proclus, Leibniz, and Hilbert, it is now believed that many of Euclid's
argumentations involve smuggled premises. Russell points out that when a
"proof" seems to depend on subject-matter otherwise than in regard to the
truth of the premises it is because the premises have not all been explicitly
stated. Beth has observed that our modern axiom systems have been
constructed by studying "proofs" of the recognized theorems to detect
hidden premises.
Beth's observation illustrates the fact that the fallacy of premise-smuggl-
ing often admits of correction: an argumentation involving a given
smuggled-premise can be transformed into a new argumentation wherein
the given premise is not smuggled - simply by adding the formerly
smuggled premise to the premise-set of the old argumentation to construct
the premise-set of the new argumentation. However, if the formerly
smuggled premise is not known to be true, then correction of premise-
smuggling introduces question-begging. Unfortunately, it is all too com-
mon that the smuggled-premise turns out to be false, or at least not known
to be true. In some cases, premise-smuggling can be corrected by adding
to the chain of reasoning a subchain that deduces the smuggled-premise
from the premises of the argumentation.
An argumentation is said to involve the fallacy of wrong conclusion
(also called ignoratio elenchi) if its chain of reasoning reaches a con-
clusion other than that of the argumentation. For example, Veblen gave a
long and involved argumentation with the conclusion that Euclidean
geometry is reducible to affine geometry but the conclusion that he
actually reached in his chain of reasoning was not this proposition, which
by the way is false, but another one which is true. This fallacy is relatively
common with thinkers who do not bother to check their actual results with
their stated goals. The fallacy of wrong conclusion can always be repaired
simply by changing the conclusion of the argumentation so that it is the
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same as the conclusion of the chain of reasoning. This is often useless. It
would be better, when possible, to lengthen the chain of reasoning so that
the conclusion of the argumentation is actually reached in the chain of
reasoning.
A chain of reasoning is said to be cogent per se if the conclusion that it
reaches is actually shown to follow from the premises that it uses. A chain
of reasoning is said to be cogent in context of an argumentation if it is
cogent per se and its conclusion and premises are respectively the conclu-
sion and among the premises of the argumentation. It is possible, as an
exercise, to construct from two proofs having different premise-sets and
different conclusions two argumentations whose chains of reasoning are
both cogent per se but both fallacious in context. Just interchange the two
chains of reasoning.
In order to be a proof it is necessary and sufficient that an argumenta-
tion have premises all known to be true and that its chain of reasoning be
cogent in context. Thus, if an argumentation is not a proof, then either it
begs the question or its chain of reasoning is fallacious in context. If its
chain of reasoning is fallacious in context then either it is fallacious per se
(and hence involves a gap or logical error in the narrow sense) or else it
smuggles a premise or it reaches the wrong conclusion. Critical evaluation
of an argumentation to determine whether it is a proof for a given person
reduces to two basic issues: are the premises known to be true by the given
person? And does the chain of reasoning deduce the conclusion from the
premise-setfor the given person?
3. Deductions: Cogent Argumentations. Every proposition that implies a
false proposition is false. We have already seen that a hypothesis can be
known to be false by deducing from it alone, or from it augmented by a
set of propositions known to be true, a proposition known to be false. The
fact that it is possible to make deductions based on premises not known to
be true is central to our intellectual life. This was already recognized by
Socrates and then articulated in some detail by Aristotle. In the critical
evaluation of an argumentation to determine whether it is a proof we often
find that the chain of reasoning is cogent in context but that the premises
are not all known to be true. We have already seen that such argumenta-
tions are nevertheless useful.
An argumentation whose chain of reasoning is cogent in context is itself
said to be cogent and an argumentation whose chain of reasoning is not
cogent in context is said to be fallacious. "Cogent in context", "cogent per
se", "fallacious in context" and "fallacious per se" apply to discourses, or
chains of reasoning, whereas "cogent" and "fallacious", simpliciter, apply
to argumentations. An argumentation is a three-part system composed of
a set of propositions called the premise-set, a single proposition called the
conclusion and a discourse called the chain of reasoning.
The word 'argumentation' comes from a Latin verb meaning "to make
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clear". The Latin verb was itself derived from the noun for "silver". The
word 'argument' would serve as well except for the fact that it is already
used in logic in a sense having virtually no connection with making
anything clear.
We have already seen that every proof is a cogent argumentation but
that not every cogent argumentation is a proof. Every cogent argumenta-
tion that fails to be a proof for a given person begs the question for that
person. The common noun 'deduction' is often used very nearly in the
sense of 'cogent argumentation'. Here we take it to be an exact synonym.
Every proof is a deduction but not every deduction is a proof. Every
proof makes evident the truth of its conclusion and every deduction makes
evident that its conclusion follows logically from its premise-set. Tarski
and others use the terms 'proof' and 'deduction' very nearly as they are
used here. Aristotle uses the terms 'demonstration' and 'perfected syllo-
gism' to make this contrast.
Every deduction whose premises are all true has true conclusion. Every
deduction whose conclusion is false has at least one false premise. No
deduction has all true premises and false conclusion. As we have seen
above in connection with the deductive method, not every deduction
having true conclusion has all true premises. In connection with the
hypothetico-deductive method we saw that not every deduction having a
false premise has false conclusion. In contrast, every proof has all true
premises and true conclusion.
Some probabilists, who hold that there are no proofs, still use the word
'proof' to indicate a deduction whose premises have been accepted as true
on good grounds. But some probabilists use the word 'proof' as a
synonym for 'deduction'. This leads to a cascade of absurd locutions such
as: 'a false premise can be used to prove a true conclusion', 'a false
proposition can be proved', 'some proofs prove false conclusions', etc. The
distinction between proofs and deductions is more or less entrenched in
ordinary learned discourse.
Every deduction is an argumentation whose conclusion is implied by its
premise-set, but not every argumentation whose conclusion is implied by
its premise-set is a deduction. In ideal applications of the deductive
method we begin with a premise-set and a conclusion that follows but is
not known to follow. The problem is to construct a chain of reasoning that
shows the conclusion to be a consequence of the premise-set. It is obvious
that not every attempt to construct such a chain of reasoning is successful.
It often happens that a fallacious chain of reasoning is found in an
argumentation whose conclusion actually follows from its premise set. The
idea that an argumentation is cogent if its conclusion follows from its
premise-set is a species of the process/product fallacy; thinking that a
process must be correct if it results in a correct product. The point is
familiar: it is possible to obtain correct results using incorrect procedures
- either by making compensating errors or by some other means.
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It is obvious that not every argumentation in the same form as a proof
is itself a proof. For example, if we have a proof using mathematical
induction as a premise and we uniformly replace number (sc. natural
number) by integer, we have transformed the proof into an argumentation
having a false premise. "Every set of integers containing zero and closed
under successor contains every integer" is false. The set of natural
numbers is a counterexample. This is the familiar point, alluded to in the
Russell quote above, that proof depends on matter as well as on form.
Some argumentations in the same form as a proof have false premises and
thus beg the question. It is at the level of deduction that the principle of
form enters logic.
Every two argumentations in the same logical form are both cogent or
both fallacious. Every argumentation in the same form as a deduction is
itself a deduction. Every argumentation in the same form as a fallacious
argumentation is itself fallacious. No fallacious argumentation has the
same form as a deduction. These are principles of form for argumentations.
Hindsight enables us to find suggestions of these principles in Aristotle's
writings but Aristotle did not attempt to articulate them.
The principle of form has been heralded as the basis for an important
economy of thought in the deductive method. According to this principle
each deduction may be regarded as a template for constructing an endless
sequence of other deductions. The creative energy expended in the
construction of one deduction serves as well for all others in the same
form.
In order to use an already constructed deduction as a template for
generating new deductions it is necessary to know how to transform a
given argumentation into another argumentation having the same form.
The simplest form-preserving transformation is the operation of substitut-
ing one new non-logical term for every occurrence of a given non-logical
term. By 'new' here is meant "not already occurring in the argumentation
operated on" and, of course, the semantic category of the new term must
be the same as the one it replaces. For example, "number" can replace
"integer" but it cannot replace "one", "even", "divides", "square-root",
"plus", etc. The operation just described is called one-new-term substitu-
tion.
Every argumentation obtained from a given argumentation by a finite
sequence of one-new-term substitutions is in the same logical form as the
given argumentation and every argumentation in the same logical form as
a given argumentation involving only finitely many non-logical terms is
obtained from the given argumentation by a finite sequence of one-new-
term substitutions. Extending this result to the case of argumentations
involving infinitely many non-logical terms is a mere technicality.
The importance of the principle of form for argumentations in effecting
an economy of thought is apt to be exaggerated. When we need to find a
chain of reasoning to deduce a given conclusion from given premises, it
27
JOHN CORCORAN
may very well be easier to construct the chain of reasoning ab initio than
to search through files of already constructed deductions. Be this as it may
be, the principle of form has another use much more important than
effecting economy of thought, viz. testing for fallacious argumentations.
Every argumentation whose premises are true and whose conclusion is
false is fallacious and every argumentation in the same form as a fallacious
argumentation is fallacious. Therefore, we can determine that a given
argumentation is fallacious by transforming it into another argumentation
whose premises are known to be true and whose conclusion is known to
be false. This method can be used to determine conclusively the fallacious-
ness of a given argumentation but it does not, by itself, determine exactly
where the chain of reasoning breaks down. In practice, it is often easy to
find the mistake once it is known for certain that there is one.
4. Arguments: "Hollow Argumentations". The "core" of an argumentation
is its chain of reasoning. In fact, the word core is a convenient acronym
for 'Chain of Reasoning'. The "bounds" of an argumentation are its
premise-set and its conclusion. The metaphor that an argumentation
"begins" with its premise-set and "ends" with its conclusion is reflected in
the etymology of the words 'premise' and 'conclusion'. It often happens in
practice, however, that construction of an argumentation ends with the
construction of the chain of reasoning and begins, not with the premise-set
alone, but with the premise-set taken together with the conclusion. It is
also common for a chain of reasoning to be generated before the premise-
set and conclusion have been chosen. It even happens, as we have seen,
that the process of generating an argumentation begins with the conclusion
and works backward alternatively generating intermediate tentative "pre-
mises" and subchains of reasoning only reaching the premise-set at the
end.
The expression argument (more clearly premise-conclusion argument)
indicates the two-part system that "bounds" an argumentation. An argu-
ment can be constructed from an argumentation by deleting the chain of
reasoning. In a sense, therefore, an argument is a "hollow argumentation".
More explicitly, an argument is a two-part system composed of a set of
propositions called its premnise-set and a single proposition called its
conclusion. The word 'argument' is widely used in technical and semi-
technical works on logic but it is rarely used in this sense in ordinary
discourse. Every argument "bounds" infinitely many argumentations but
no argument is an argumentation. The expressions 'premise-set' and 'con-
clusion' are role words which have no meaning except in connection with
an argument. Every proposition is a premise of infinitely many arguments
and it is the conclusion of infinitely many arguments. An argument can be
constructed by arbitrarily choosing a set of propositions to serve as
premise-set and a single proposition to serve as conclusion.
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In some cases a premise used in a chain of reasoning is not a premise of
an argument that bounds it. In this case, the argumentation smuggles a
premise. In some cases the conclusion of the chain of reasoning is not the
conclusion of an argument that bounds it. Here we have ignoratio elenchi,
or wrong conclusion. In some cases the bounding argument of an argu-
mentation has premises not among the premises used in the chain of
reasoning. In fact every argumentation having infinitely many premises has
infinitely many premises that are not used, i.e. that are not premises of its
chain of reasoning. The reason for this is that every chain of reasoning,
whether cogent or fallacious, is finite and therefore uses only a finite
number of premises. This may seem to be partly a matter of terminology.
What is not merely terminological is the fact that every cogent chain of
reasoning is finite. This is closely related to the fact that deduction is a
temporal activity performed by thinkers. Every cogent chain of reasoning
makes evident (to those thinkers to whom it is cogent) the fact that its
conclusion is implied by the premises it uses. Some mathematicians who
work with infinite sets and infinite sequences seem to have a tendency to
overlook the inherent finiteness of chains of reasoning.
Infinite arguments, i.e. arguments having an infinite number of premises,
had already been considered by Aristotle and they have become important
in modern logic. Consider the sequence of propositions generated from
"zero is exceeded by zero plus one" by repeated replacement of both
occurrences of "zero" by "zero plus one". The set of these propositions
does not imply "Every number is exceeded by itself-plus-one" but if a
suitable proposition of mathematical induction is added the resulting set
does imply the generalization. Here are two infinite arguments, in one the
conclusion does not follow from the premise-set and in the other it does
follow.
There is no condition on a proposition-set or proposition and no
relationship between a proposition-set and a proposition necessary for
them to be the premise-set and conclusion of an argument. If the con-
clusion is a logical consequence of the premise-set, the argument is said to
be valid. If the conclusion is not a logical consequence of the premise-set,
the argument is said to be invalid. Every argument is either valid or
invalid and no argument is both valid and invalid. Every argument
obtained by adding premises to a valid argument is valid. Every argument
obtained by deleting premises from an invalid argument is invalid.
The fact that Tarski and other mathematical logicians lack the concepts
"argument", "valid" and "invalid" does not entail that they cannot express
certain facts. To say that an argument is valid is to say that certain
propositions imply a certain proposition or that a certain proposition
follows from or is a consequence of certain propositions. Aristotle, it
should be said, lacked a relational verb for "implies" and lacked a rela-
tional noun for "consequence".
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In this and in most works on logic, to say that an argument is (logically)
valid is simply to say something about the relationship of its conclusion
to its premise-set, viz. that the conclusion follows (logically) from, is
(logically) implied by, is a (logical) consequence of, its premise-set. The
words 'logically' and 'logical' are redundant rhetoric which are added or
omitted according to taste or other inconsequential consideration. The
words 'necessarily' and 'necessary' are likewise merely rhetorical. An
argument that is valid is necessarily valid and conversely. Other words that
are used in this way are 'formal', 'formally', 'deductive' and 'deductively'.
There are many useful ways to characterize the relation "logical conse-
quence". In order for a conclusion to be a logical consequence of a
premise-set it is necessary and sufficient for the information of the
premise-set to include that of the conclusion, in other words, for there to
be no information in the conclusion beyond that already in the premise-
set. In order for a conclusion to be a logical consequence of a premise-set
it is necessary and sufficient that it be logically impossible for the premises
to all be true with the conclusion false. In order for a conclusion to be a
logical consequence of a premise-set it is necessary and sufficient that
were the premises all true then necessarily the conclusion would be true,
in other words, that were the conclusion false then necessarily at least one
premise would be false.
It would be an illusion to think that any one of the above characteriza-
tions by itself or even in combination with the others is sufficient to
uniquely identify "logical consequence" for every reader. Those who have
grasped the concept do not need any characterization. Indeed these
readers will easily find objections to the above. Those who have not yet
grasped the concept will need to experience examples of instances and
examples of non-instances and they will need hints as well. The problem
of characterizing "logical consequence", despite insightful attempts by
Carnap, Tarski, and Quine, is still open.
No true proposition implies even one false proposition. Every true
proposition is implied by infinitely many false propositions. Every false
proposition implies infinitely many true propositions. Every proposition
implying its own negation is false. Every proposition implied by its own
negation is true. Every proposition implying a certain proposition and also
implying the negation of that certain proposition is false. Every proposi-
tion implied by a certain proposition and also by the negation of that
certain proposition is true. Every proposition implies itself.
It is of course not the case that every true proposition implies every
other true proposition. Nor is it the case that every false proposition
implies every true proposition. Nor is it the case that every false proposi-
tion implies every other false proposition. Except in the case of all true
premises and false conclusion, the validity or invalidity of an argument is
not determined by the truth-values of its propositions. Validity, or implica-
tion, is not "truth-functional".
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The principles of form for arguments, which are not to be found either
in Aristotle or in Tarski, are the following. Every argument in the same
form as a valid argument is valid. Every argument in the same form as an
invalid argument is invalid. Every two arguments in the same form are
both valid or both invalid.
Despite the absence of the principles of form in Aristotle and in Tarski
each uses a principle of form as the basis for proofs of invalidity. Not
every invalid argument is known to be invalid. Ideally speaking, every
argument whose premises are known to be true and whose conclusion is
known to be false is known to be invalid. In a sense, such arguments may
be said to be "obviously" invalid. This method of establishing invalidity,
which is called the method of fact, is applicable only to a small fraction of
the invalid arguments. The principle of form makes it possible to reduce
invalidity of arguments not obviously invalid to the invalidity of obviously
invalid ones.
In order to establish that "No proposition is both true and false" does
not imply "Every proposition is either true or false" it is sufficient to
notice that "No number is both positive and negative" is true whereas
"Every number is either positive or negative" is false. In order to establish
the invalidity of a given argument it is sufficient to exhibit an argument
known to be in the same form whose premises are known to be true and
whose conclusion is known to be false. The proposition "Every conse-
quence of a consequence of a proposition is again a consequence of that
proposition" is not implied by the proposition "Every consequence of a
consequence of a consequence of a proposition is again a consequence of
that proposition". To see this take 'is an opposite of' to mean "is logically
equivalent to the negation of" and substitute "opposite" for "consequence".
A counterargument for a given argument is an argument having all true
premises and false conclusion and in the same form as the given argument.
The method of counterarguments for establishing invalidity amounts
to exhibiting a known counterargument, i.e. an argument known to be
a counterargument. The method of counterarguments is applied with
meticulous precision throughout Aristotle's logical works. It is employed
throughout the history of logic, e.g. to show that the parallel postulate is
not implied by the other basic premises of geometry and to show that the
continuum hypothesis is not implied by the axioms of set theory. It is the
only method for establishing invalidity mentioned in Tarski's works.
Whether it is the only method possible is a question that seems not to
have been discussed systematically.
Not every valid argument is known to be valid. Much of current
research in philosophy, mathematics, theoretical physics and other fields
would be pointless were this not the case. In many cases an argument
under investigation is actually valid and the goal of the investigation will
only be achieved once the argument is known to be valid. It is surprising
that some writers seem to think that a proof is a valid argument whose
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premises are true. This double fallacy involves conflation of the ontic and
the epistemic: conflating "true" with "known to be true", and conflating
"valid" with "known to be valid". Ideally speaking every proposition
known to be implied by propositions known to be true is itself proved to
be true. But a proposition that is implied by propositions known to be true
is not necessarily proved to be true unless it is also known to be implied.
Either Goldbach's Hypothesis or its negation is implied by propositions
known to be true, viz. by the axioms of arithmetic. And yet neither
Goldbach's Hypothesis nor its negation has been proved to be true.
Likewise, a proposition known to be implied by propositions which are
true is not necessarily proved to be true unless the implying propositions
are known to be true. Every proposition is implied by itself. A fortiori
every true proposition is implied by a true proposition. But not every true
proposition has been proved to be true.
In some cases thinking that an argument shows or proves may be
confusing the technical meaning of the word 'argument' with its etymo-
logical connotation. This type of confusion is often risked when stipulative
definitions are used.
It is clear that a valid argument per se "proves" nothing, not even that
its conclusion follows from its premise-set. In order to know that a valid
argument is valid it is sufficient to deduce the conclusion from the
premises, to construct a chain of reasoning that is cogent in the context of
the argument. Thinking that a valid argument "shows" its own validity is an
ontic/epistemic fallacy. Moreover, it involves confusion of the ontic
relation-verb 'implies' with the epistemic action-verb 'deduce' (or 'infer').
Implication is a static atemporal relation from sets of propositions to
single propositions. Deduction is an epistemic action performed by
thinker-agents in "drawing forth" particular information from other infor-
mation in which it is already contained. Deduction takes place in time.
Deduction is the process of coming to know implication.
It is clear that in order to know whether a given argument is valid or
invalid it is never necessary to know the truth-values of the premises and
conclusion (of the given argument). A deduction is sufficient for knowl-
edge of validity. A counterargument is sufficient for knowledge of in-
validity. Failure to achieve a deduction does not establish invalidity.
Failure to achieve a counterargument does not establish validity. The
absence of positive evidence by itself is never conclusive negative evidence
and the absence of negative evidence by itself is never conclusive positive
evidence. In the absence both of a deduction and of a counterargument
the validity/invalidity of the argument is often unknown.
Validating an argument is determining that it is valid, gaining knowl-
edge of its validity. Invalidating an argument is determining that it is
invalid. It is convenient to refer to the process of constructing a deduction
for an argument as deducing the argument and to say that an argument
admitting of validation by deduction is deducible. Likewise it is convenient
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to refer to the process of constructing a counterargument for an argument
as refuting the argument and to say that an argument admitting of invalida-
tion by counterargument is refutable. It is clear that deducibility and
refutability are participant-relative.
The above terminology applying to arguments is paralleled by a
commonly used terminology applying to propositions.
Verifying a proposition is determining that it is true, gaining knowledge
of its truth. Falsifying a proposition is determining that it is false. The
process of constructing a proof for a proposition is proving the proposi-
tion, and a proposition admitting of verification by proof is provable. The
process of constructing a disproof of a proposition is disproving the propo-
sition and a proposition admitting of falsification by disproof is disprovable.
It is clear that provability and disprovability are participant-relative.
Provability is a criterion of truth and disprovability is a criterion of
falsity. Deducibility is a criterion of validity and refutability is a criterion
of invalidity.
Once these distinctions are clear it is easy to restate some of the
perennial problems concerning the scope and limits of human knowledge.
The hypothesis that every true proposition is verifiable, which has been
called the hypothesis of sufficient reason, is analogous to each of the
following hypotheses: every false proposition is falsifiable, every valid
argument is deducible, every invalid argument is refutable. The converses
of all four of these hypotheses are, of course, true. Each hypothesis, then,
amounts to a hypothesis to the effect that an epistemic property is
coextensive with a corresponding ontic property. There are two further
hypotheses deserving of mention: every valid argument is validatable,
every invalid argument is invalidatable. As with all perennial problems in
philosophy, insight and maturity can be achieved through careful discus-
sion of them.
5. Derivations: Cogent Chains of Reasoning. A proof solves the problem
of whether its conclusion is true by reducing it to a problem that has
already been solved, viz., the problem of whether its premises are all true.
A deduction reduces the problem of whether its conclusion is true to a
problem that has not necessarily been solved, viz. the problem of whether
its premises are all true. But it is equally accurate to make a figure-ground
shift and to observe that a deduction reduces the problem of whether at
least one of its premises is false to the problem of whether its conclusion is
false. But it is again equally accurate to say that a deduction actually solves
a problem, viz. the problem of whether its premise-set implies its con-
clusion, or as we will say, the problem of whether its bounding argument is
valid.
How does a deduction solve this problem? How does a deduction make
evident that the answer is affirmative? How does a deduction make
evident the fact that its bounding argument is valid? What makes a chain
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of reasoning cogent? This is the cogency question. Discussion of this
question requires that we examine some types of cogent chains of reason-
ing. Let us use the word derivation to indicate a chain of reasoning that is
cogent per se, i.e. that establishes, shows, makes clear, makes evident the
fact that its final conclusion is a logical consequence of the propositions it
uses as premises.
A very simple type of derivation perhaps the simplest, is the class of
linear derivations. Roughly speaking, a chain of reasoning is linear if it is a
sequence of propositions beginning with, one of its premises, ending with
the conclusion, and each subsequent member of which either is a premise
or else is the conclusion of a component argument whose premises have
already occurred. It is clear that the cogency of a linear derivation pre-
supposes knowledge of the validity of the component arguments. A
deduction whose derivation is linear seems to reduce the problem of the
validity of its bounding argument to problems already solved, viz. to the
problems of the validity of the component arguments.
In order for a linear deduction to be cogent for a given person, that
person must have knowledge of the validity of the component arguments.
A linear chain of reasoning that is cogent for one person need not, and
normally will not, be cogent for all other persons. An argumentation using
a component argument not known to be valid by the intended audience
involves the fallacy of begging the argument which, of course, is analogous
to the fallacy of begging the question. A component argument not known
to be valid is commonly referred to as "a gap in the chain of reasoning". In
some cases a begged argument is later deduced to the satisfaction of the
intended audience and in these cases we may say that the gap has been
filled by interpolation of additional steps of reasoning. In some cases,
however, a begged argument is actually invalid and, thus, the gap cannot
be filled. The term non sequitur is used in either case.
As Poincar6 and others have pointed out, knowledge of the correctness
of each step in a sequence is not sufficient for knowledge of the correct-
ness of the sequence. It is possible to validate each step in a derivation
without gaining knowledge that the conclusion is implied by its premises.
It is clear then that the cogency of a linear derivation requires, besides
knowledge of the validity of the component arguments, knowledge that the
conclusion of a "sequential chain" of valid arguments is implied by its
"ultimate premises".
There are several "chaining principles" which were already known to
Alexander and to the Stoics. Perhaps the simplest such principle applies to
the case of a three-line derivation constructed by chaining two one-
premise arguments: every given argument whose conclusion is the con-
clusion of a valid one-premise argument the premise of which is the
conclusion of a second valid one-premise argument the premise of which
is a premise of the given argument is valid. This amounts to the so-called
principle of transitivity of consequence: every consequence of a conse-
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quence of a given proposition is again a consequence of that proposition.
Another example is the principle that applies to a chaining of three one-
premise arguments: every consequence of a consequence of a consequence
of a given proposition is again a consequence of the given proposition.
Then we have the case of the "cascading" of three two-premise argu-
ments: every given argument whose conclusion is the conclusion of a valid
two-premise argument the premises of which are each conclusions of valid
two-premise arguments the premises of which comprise the premises of
the given argument is valid. It is clear that for each method of chaining
arguments to make a linear derivation there is a chaining principle to the
effect that whenever the component arguments are valid the conclusion is
implied by the premises.
There seems to be no independent evidence to support the hypothesis
that every person for whom a linear deduction is cogent knows an appro-
priate chaining principle. An alternative hypothesis is that every person
who follows or constructs linear derivations knows of a few principles
from which the others can be deduced. However, even were it true there is
little hope that it could be used to explain the cogency of linear deriva-
tions.
The point here is that we should not be tempted to believe that the
person to whom a derivation is cogent proved the proposition that the
argument is valid by deducing it from metalogical propositions already
known to be true. In the first place, this would involve us in an infinite
regress: the objectlanguage deduction presupposing a metalanguage deduc-
tion presupposing a metametalanguage deduction and so on. In the second
place, it may involve us in a self-contradiction. A cogent derivation makes
evident (to anyone for whom it is cogent) that its conclusion is implied by
its premises; by referring to a metalogical proof we ran the risk of having
assumed that the derivation did not make the implication evident.
Explaining a derivation is like explaining a "joke". If the explanation is
needed to get the participant to laugh then it was not a joke. If the "joke"
plus the explanation elicits laughter then it is the combination which is the
joke, not just the "joke" simpliciter. Likewise, if the explanation is needed
to get the participant to validate the argument then the chain of reasoning
was not cogent to the participant. If the added explanation succeeds then
the original chain of reasoning with the explanation added is cogent, not
the original chain of reasoning simpliciter. To paraphrase Church, it is
never necessary to prove that a proof is a proof.
The cogency question should never be construed as the problem of
explaining why a derivation is not really cogent as it stands, nor as the
problem of explaining why a chain of reasoning that is not cogent really is
cogent. Just as the humor question, let us say, is the problem of explaining
why a funny joke is funny and is not the problem of rescuing an unsuc-
cessful "joke".
The discussion thus far shows that a deduction does not reduce the
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validity of its bounding argument to the validity of its component argu-
ments alone even if it is acceptable to say that a deduction reduces the
validity of its bounding argument to the validity of its component argu-
ments.
The problem of chaining, let us say, is not the obvious problem in
explaining cogency. The obvious problem, rather, is the problem of how
the validity of the component arguments is known. To say that they are
known by deduction is true but evasive and perhaps even question-
begging. It is clear that if any argument is known to be valid by reduction
to arguments already known to be valid then some arguments must have
been known to be valid without being so reduced. Such ultimate argu-
ments may be said to be immediately validated. This does not mean that it
takes no time to validate them. It only means that they have been validated
without "mediating reasoning". Aristotle calls these "perfect syllogisms".
They correspond to trivial derivations i.e. to linear derivations having but
one component argument. Of these Aristotle says that nothing need be
added in order for it to be evident that the conclusion follows. Of such
arguments we say that the conclusion is deduced immediately from the
premises. Quine uses the phrase "visibly sound" in a parallel situation.
Quine by the way is one of the few mathematically-oriented logicians who
mention this topic at all. Tarski has not written a word on it.
Being immediately validated is inherently participant-relative, i.e. to say
that an argument is immediately validated is to make tacit reference to a
thinker who has immediately validated it. To such a thinker the linear
derivation consisting solely of premises and conclusion had been cogent at
a time when no extended deduction for it had been done. This is not to
say that no extended deduction could have been done. Moreover, saying
that an argument is immediately validated by a given person neither
implies nor excludes that it is immediately validated by many other
persons, perhaps even by all thinkers. Saying that an argument is im-
mediately validated is saying something about the epistemic history of a
thinker.
The combinations "immediately valid", "immediately implies", "immedi-
ately follows from" and the like are incoherent. They mix an epistemic
concept, "immediately", with an ontic concept, "valid", "implies", etc., in a
way that gibberish results. If an argument is immediately validated we may
say that the premise-set leads immediately to the conclusion or that the
conclusion is immediately deduced from or immediately derived from the
premise-set.
Despite the fact that many responsible thinkers have concluded that no
proposition is known to be true, virtually no one has concluded that no
argument is known to be valid. Despite the fact that many responsible
thinkers have concluded that no proposition is immediately verified,
virtually no one has challenged the view that some arguments are immedi-
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ately validated. Nevertheless, understanding of deduction, the linchpin of
rationality, requires understanding of how immediately validated argument
are known to be valid. The fundamental problem of deduction is to
explain how immediately validated arguments are known to be valid.
The above description of linear derivations is an oversimplification. The
crucial deficiency is that it describes the derivation as a sequence of
objectlanguage propositions. The most casual observation of the facts
reveals that this is not so. Every derivation involves instructions for
carrying out a train of thought and there is no way that a sequence of
objectlanguage propositions can contain instructions for deducing one of
them from others. Many propositionals, let us say, in a derivation are
imperative, not declarative. They instruct us to carry out various epistemic
acts most prominent of which are assuming and inferring: "assume such
and such", "from so and so infer such and such". Besides the assume-
instructions that introduce premises of the derivation there are assume-
instructions that introduce auxiliary assumptions, which are introduced for
purposes of reasoning and which are later discharged. There are others as
well.
An auxiliary assumption in a derivation initiates a subchain of reason-
ing the completion of which serves as the mediating basis for an inference
from the previous assumptions. Perhaps the simplest case is the simple
indirect derivation. Here after assuming the premises we assume as an
auxiliary the negation of the conclusion thereby initiating a subchain. We
then proceed to make a sequence of immediate inferences until we arrive
at a contradiction, i.e. until we have a proposition and its negation. Then
we note the contradiction and end the subchain. On the mediating basis of
the subchain we infer the conclusion itself. The last line of an indirect
deduction is something to the following effect: "Since we have deduced a
contradiction from the initial premises augmented by the negation of the
conclusion, we infer the conclusion itself from the initial premises alone".
Incidentally, when a person knows to be true the negation of any
proposition the person knows to be false, a disproof of a hypothesis
amounts to an indirect proof of (the truth of) the negation of the hypoth-
esis. Thus, the hypothetico-deductive method often admits of being
transformed into a submethod of the deductive method. It may well be the
case that indirect deduction, which is rather intricate, is an evolutionary
descendant of the hypothetico-deductive method, which is elemental.
Many sensible things have been said about indirect derivations, e.g. that
an indirect derivation shows that the conclusion follows from the premises
by showing that the negation of the conclusion is inconsistent with the
premises, or that an indirect derivation shows that the conclusion follows
from the premises by showing that it is logically impossible for the
premises to be true with the conclusion false.
According to standard accounts linear derivations are not constructed
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by chaining arguments but rather by applying rules of inference (to
premises and then to results of previous applications). Of course, the
resulting derivations could be described either way. In fact, each such rule
amounts to a set of arguments, viz. the set of instances of the rule. For
example, in order for an argument to be an instance of modus ponens it is
necessary and sufficient that it be a two-premise argument one of whose
premises is the conditional whose antecedent is the other premise and
whose consequent is the conclusion.
The observation that derivations are constructed by chaining immedi-
ately validated arguments that can be collected under rules is of course
due to Aristotle. Moreover, the hypothesis that deduction is in some sense
a rule-governed activity seems well-confirmed by practice. Nevertheless,
this hypothesis does not seem to contribute to the solutions of any of the
problems already mentioned and, in fact, it suggests further problems.
As has been pointed out by others, there are three species of knowl-
edge: objectual knowledge or knowledge of objects (entities, concepts,
propositions, argumentations), operational knowledge or known-how to
perform various tasks, and propositional knowledge or knowledge that
propositions are true or false. It is already clear that cogency of a deriva-
tion requires all three and that it pivots on operational knowledge. In
order to follow a derivation it is necessary to be able to perform various
operations most prominently assuming and immediate inferring but also
operations involved in "chaining".
6. Expressions and Meanings. Some sentences express propositions and
some do not. The sentence 'Two exceeds one' expresses the true proposi-
tion "Two exceeds one". The sentence 'One exceeds two' expresses the
false proposition "One exceeds two". The properties "true" and "false"
have as their range of applicability the class of propositions. Any attempt
to affirm or to deny "true" or "false" of a non-proposition results in
gibberish, incoherence, category error, nonsense. The sentences 'One is
true' and 'One is false' do not express propositions at all.
It is likewise incoherent to attempt to affirm or to deny "true" or "false"
of an argument, an argumentation, or a chain of reasoning. The class of
arguments is the range of applicability of "valid" and of "invalid". It is
incoherent to say that a proposition is valid or is invalid. The class of
argumentations is the range of applicability of "conclusive" (sc. "apodictic")
and of "inconclusive" (sc. "nonapodictic"). It is incoherent to say that a
proposition or an argument is conclusive or is inconclusive.
"Cogent per se", "cogent in context", "fallacious per se", and "fallacious
in context" all apply exclusively to chains of reasoning. "Cogent" and
"fallacous" simpliciter apply exclusively to argumentations. An argumenta-
tion is cogent or fallacious according as its chain of reasoning is cogent in
context or fallacious in context.
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The relation-verb 'implies' is tenseless. Its subject is a set of proposi-
tions and its object is a proposition. The sentence 'One implies two' is
incoherent, as is the sentence 'Tarski implies two'. In other English writing
the sentence 'Tarski implied that logic is a science' is coherent. In fact it
expresses a true proposition but only when 'implies' is taken in another
sense. The other sense is called agent implication.
The action-verb 'deduce' is tensed. Its subject is a thinker, its direct
object is a proposition and its indirect object is a set of propositions. It is
often the case that the distinction between a set of propositions and a
single proposition is unmarked but it must always be understood in order
to avoid incoherence. 'Euclid deduced the Pythagorean Theorem from the
Basic Premises of Geometry' expresses an (arguably) true proposition.
'Russell deduced his whole body from his left foot' is incoherent (but
humorous praise of Russell's powers of reasoning).
Tragic confusion in logic has resulted from failure to heed the above
and other selection restrictions, or semantic-category constraints. The
importance of observing them was first pointed out by Plato in the
Cratylus. The theory of semantic categories was advanced by Aristotle and
more recently by Husserl, Russell, Tarski, Quine and others. It was Quine,
for example who made it clear that 'If two exceeds three then three
exceeds two' is coherent and expresses a true proposition whereas 'Two
exceeds three implies three exceeds two' is incoherent and "'Two exceeds
three" implies "Three exceeds two"' is coherent but expresses a false
proposition.
There is no way to develop a coherent philosophy of logic without
careful attention to coherent discourse.
Many logicians, whether mathematically oriented or not, believe that
"true" and "false" are properties of sentences rather than of propositions
as is presupposed in this essay. This is a fundamental disagreement that
should not be glossed over. It is easy to read remarks to the effect that a
sentence is true (or false) as elliptical for remarks that the sentence
expresses a proposition which is true (or false). But there are many places
where this becomes awkward. For example, the sentence 'Every even
number is not prime' admits of "scope ambiguity" in regard to 'not' and
thus can be used to express the true proposition "Not every even number
is prime" as well as to express the false proposition "Every even number is
non-prime". To avoid this and other conflicts, Quine and Tarski restrict
the class of sentences under consideration to sentences of formalized (or
regimented) languages from which ambiguity has been eliminated.
However, in eliminating ambiguity such writers make it awkward or
impossible to discuss phenomena traditionally and properly discussed in
logic. For example, discussion of the fallacy of ambiguity requires the
distinction between expression and meaning. For example, a person might
believe that "No even number is prime" on the strength of an alleged
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proof whose premises are "2 is an even number" and "2 is not prime". The
person first (correctly) deduces "Not every even number is prime" but
writes the result 'Every even number is not prime'. Then this is read
"Every even number is non-prime" from which "No even number is
prime" is (correctly) deduced. The fallacy consists in reading a sentence
one way when the proposition intended is being inferred and reading it
another way when the other proposition intended is being used as the
basis of an inference.
Just as we have distinguished propositions from sentences we likewise
distinguish discourses from discourse-texts, arguments from argument-
texts and argumentations from argumentation-texts. The property "ambi-
guous" applies exclusively to expressions. In order for an expression to be
ambiguous it is necessary and sufficient for it to express two or more
meanings. It is clear that ambiguity is participant-relative even though a
given expression is often ambiguous to every member of a given com-
munity of participants. It is incoherent to say that a proposition (or any
other non-expression) is ambiguous.
Just as some sentences are elliptical, likewise other expressions, e.g.
argument-texts are elliptical. In some cases, perhaps most, ellipsis involves
ambiguity. For example, the sentence '6 has more divisors of 30 than 15'
expresses a true proposition if the ellipsis is 'of' but it expresses a false
proposition if the ellipsis is 'does'. The two propositions in question are
expressed:
6 has more divisors of 30 than of 15.
6 has more divisors of 30 than does 15.
In an elliptical discourse-text, words are omitted from sentences and
sentences themselves are omitted. Making the distinction of argument-text
from argument makes it possible to make sense of the ancient doctrine of
the enthymeme, incoherently described as an argument with a suppressed
premise. An enthymeme is an elliptical argument-text. It is incoherent to
say that an enthymeme is valid or invalid as these properties apply
exclusively to arguments.
Many proof-texts are elliptical. Some problems in the history of mathe-
matics involve supplying missing parts of elliptical discourses so that the
reasoning of ancient thinkers can be reconstructed and appreciated. Is it a
miracle that Euclid's geometry is pervaded by fallacious reasoning and
yet contains no false "theorems" or is Euclid's reasoning elliptically
expressed? Although modern logicians are meticulous about full expres-
sion of objectlanguage proofs, virtually every argumentation-text intended
to express a proof of a metatheorem either is enthymematic or else
expresses argumentation that smuggles premises. Historians of modern
40
ARGUMENTATIONS AND LOGIC
logic might find it ironic that modern logic books are pervaded by the
same deficiencies (viz. ellipsis and premise-smuggling) that the books
themselves charge Euclid with.
7. Conclusion. Some people say that logic is about "argument forms" and
not about "concrete arguments", i.e. arguments whose non-logical terms
are actual concepts as opposed to schematic letters, variables, or what
have you. In this essay the expression 'argument' is used in such a way that
every argument is concrete, there is no such thing as "an abstract argu-
ment", "an argument devoid of concrete terms", "a formal argument", etc.
Every argument is composed of propositions and every proposition is
either true as it stands or false as it stands.
Aristotle says that the subject-matter of logic is proof, that logic is the
systematic study of proofs. Quine says that logic is the systematic study of
tautologies. A tautology, of course, is a proposition that is implied by its
own negation, or, as Quine says, "is true no matter what". What Quine has
in mind is that since a tautology is implied by itself and by its own
negation, it is true whether it is true or not, and thus is "true no matter
what". It is also clear, as Quine has also emphasized, that in order to be a
tautology it is necessary and sufficient for a proposition to be implied by
absolutely every and any proposition. Since a consequence of each of two
propositions has no information not contained in both, if a proposition
and its negation share no information, a tautology is empty, i.e. devoid of
information. This should be no surprise to those who take as a paradigm
of tautology any of the following: "Every number is identical to itself".
"Every even number is even", "Every number is either even or not even".
So Quine thinks that logic is the systematic study of empty propositions,
whether he would put it this way is beside the point.
The negation of a tautology is a contradiction, a proposition that
implies its own negation. A contradiction may be said to be "false no
matter what" since it implies itself and it implies its own negation, and thus
is false whether it is false or not. In order to be a contradiction it is
necessary and sufficient that a proposition imply absolutely every and any
proposition. Thus a contradiction contains any information contained in
any proposition. In other words, a contradiction is absolutely comprehen-
sive, it contains all information.
Now Aristotle says that opposites are studied by the same science. This
might imply that any science of tautologies is a science of contradictions as
well, and thus that Quine's view implies that logic is also the systematic
study of contradictions. Quine should not object to this. Quine says that
the only reason that tautologies are important is that implication can be
explained by means of "tautology". But it is as correct to say, in the same
sense, that implication can be explained by means of "contradiction". By
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the way, we have just seen that implication can be used to explain
"tautology" and "contradiction".
Quine also says that the reason implication is important is that, since
every proposition implied by a true proposition is true, we use knowledge
of implication to justify or to form new beliefs on the basis of old beliefs.
Thus, by tracking down the explanations that Quine gives for his ap-
parently strange view, we find that it is not so far from Aristotle's view
after all. This conclusion is all the more plausible once we take account of
the fact that in pronouncing on the nature of logic the masters were
probably not intending to give precise "theorems" but merely to point the
student in the right direction, to give the beginner an idea of what lies
ahead.
Now if logic is the study of proofs and if opposites are studied in the
same science, then logic is the study of proofs and of non-proofs, of
conclusive argumentations and of inconclusive argumentations, in short, of
argumentations. Thus Aristotelian principles lead to the view that logic is
the study of argumentations. Taking logic to be the study of argumenta-
tions, in the fullest sense, takes logic to include a vast array of phenomena.
If the goal of a pronouncement on the nature of logic is to point the
student in the right direction, then it seems to me that logic should be
pronounced to be the systematic study of argumentations. As we have
seen, this will bring the student to see the relevance of logic to many fields
and to see the relevance of many fields to logic. Philosophy, linguistics,
mathematics and cognitive psychology are perhaps the fields with the
greatest commonality with logic. If "rational animal" is even a fair approxi-
mation to a definition of "human", then logic should be prominent among
the humanities. But perhaps logic is more of a quest than a subject.
Perhaps logic should be defined as the quest for an objective understand-
ing of objectivity. This would be in keeping with the spirit of Aristotle,
Ockham, Boole, Frege, Russell, Tarski, and Quine, to mention only a few
of the tireless workers who have created this magnificent edifice.
The fact that this essay has revealed difficult problems about the nature
of logic and about the possibility of objectivity may lead some readers to
infer that the goal of the essay is more destructive, or deconstructive, than
constructive. Such an inference would be a distortion of my intentions and
it would be contrary to the spirit of logic. Objectivity requires that
objective standards of criticism be applied to themselves. Otherwise
dedication to objectivity becomes a mockery of itself. Logicians cannot
aspire to objective evaluation of methodology in other fields unless they
apply the same standards to logic itself. Dogmatism and skepticism are
twin enemies of objectivity. Self-criticism of logic, and in particular the
attempt in this century to give a rational reconstruction of logic, has led
both to revolutionary advances in logic and, more importantly, to a richer
understanding of the human condition. Knowing that a proposition is true
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does not require knowing that it is known to be true nor does it require a
feeling of certainty. It is the denial of this point, not the admission of it,
that leads to dogmatism and to skepticism.
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